Abstract-Chameleon all-but-one trapdoor function (ABO-TDF) is an important and useful primitive which was introduced in [9] . With the help of it, a more efficient blackbox construction of public key encryption (PKE) scheme, which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), can be given. In this paper, we formally generalize the construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs. As a special case of our generalization, a concrete construction of ABO-TDFs, which was first introduced by Peikert and Waters [1], is presented. Although the existence of lossy trapdoor functions is equivalent to that of ABO-TDFs by using the conversion in [1], as Peikert et al. said, the conversion involves some degradation in lossiness (i.e. additional leakage). Therefore, in this sense, our result is different from those in [21] where Hemenway et al. proved that homomorphic encryption with some additional properties implies lossy trapdoor functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
L OSSY trapdoor functions (LTDFs) were first introduced by Peikert and Waters [1] - [3] and further studied in [4] - [12] . LTDFs imply lots of fundamental cryptographic primitives, such as collision-resistant hash functions, oblivious transfer, etc. In addition, they can also be used to construct many cryptographic schemes, such as deterministic public-key encryption, encryption and commitments that are secure against selective opening attacks. Most important of all, LTDFs enable black-box construction of CCA secure PKE schemes (see [13] - [20] and their references).
LTDF is centered around the idea of losing information. Informally, LTDF is a public function f that is created to behave in one of two ways. The first way corresponds to the usual completeness condition for an (injective) trapdoor function: given a suitable trapdoor for f , the entire input x can be efficiently recovered from f (x). In the second way, f statistically loses a significant amount of information about its input, i.e. most outputs of f have many preimages. Finally, the two behaviors are indistinguishable: given just the public description of f , no efficient adversary can tell whether f is injective or lossy.
LTDFs were further extended to a richer abstraction called all-but-one trapdoor functions (ABO-TDFs). In an ABO collection, each function has an extra input called its branch. All of the branches are injective trapdoor functions (having the same trapdoor value), except for one branch which is lossy. The lossy branch is specified as a parameter to the function sampler, and its value is hidden by the resulting function description.
The black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE from LTDFs in [1] needs a collection of LTDFs, a collection of ABO-TDFs, a pair-wise independent family of hash functions, and a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme, where the set of verification keys is a subset of the branch set of the ABO collection.
Since LTDFs implies CCA secure PKE schemes, in [21] , Hemenway and Ostrovsky considered the problem whether homomorphic encryption implies LTDFs. Fortunately, they found the "bridge" and presented an excellent construction of LTDFs from homomorphic encryption schemes with some additional properties.
About LTDFs and ABO-TDFs, in [1] , Peikert and Waters has proved that, from the perspective of existence, LTDFs are equivalent to ABO-TDFs with binary branch sets and an ABO collection for large branch sets can also be constructed from one with just binary branch set. However, their conversion involves some degradation in lossiness (i.e. additional leakage) and whether this can be improved remains open [1] .
Lai et al. [9] introduced a new notion named chameleon ABO-TDFs whose goal is to replace ABO-TDFs and strongly unforgeable one-time signature in the construction of CCA-secure PKE schemes, which can improve the efficiency of [1] . They also proposed a concrete construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs based on any secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) homomorphic public key encryption scheme with some additional properties, like the Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme [22] .
A. Our Contributions
In this paper, we formally generalize the construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs, which includes their construction as a special case. As another special case of our generalization, a concrete construction of ABO-TDFs instead of lossy trapdoor functions is also presented, which does not involve degradation of lossiness. Since the lossiness amount of information is of key importance for the construction of CCA-secure public key schemes, in this sense, our result is different from that of [21] .
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some standard notions and cryptographic definitions. In Section 3 we describe our generic construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs. In Section 4, we give two special cases which can be regarded as two applications of our generic construction. In Section 5, we describe a simple homomorphic encryption scheme which can be used in our construction.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we review some standard notations and cryptographic definitions.
A. Basic Concepts
Let N be the set of natural numbers. If M is a set, then we let |M | denote its size and m R ← − M denote picking element m uniformly at random from M. Let λ be a security parameter and PPT is probabilistic polynomial time. Let z ← A(x, y, · · · ) denote the operation of running an algorithm A with inputs (x, y, · · · ) and output z. A function negl(λ) is negligible (in λ) if negl(λ) = o(λ −c ) for any constant c > 0. Let U denote the uniform distribution on -bit binary strings.
B. Cryptographic Notions 1) Lossy Trapdoor Functions: Let n(λ) = poly(λ) be the length of the functions's input and k(λ) ≤ n(λ) denotes the lossiness of the collection. Moreover, we also define the residual leakage value r(λ) = n(λ) − k(λ).
Definition 1 (Lossy Trapdoor Functions [1] - [3] ): A collection of (n, k)-lossy trapdoor functions is given by a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (S inj , S loss , F ,F −1 ) having the following properties.
1) Easy to sample an injective function with trapdoor:
where s is a function index and t is its trapdoor, F (s, ·) computes an injective (deterministic) function f s (·) over the domain {0, 1} n , and
2) Easy to sample a lossy function: S loss (1 λ ) outputs s, where s is a function index, and F (s, ·) computes a (deterministic) function f s (·) over the domain {0, 1}
n whose image has size at most 2 r = 2 n−k . 3) Hard to distinguish injective from lossy: The ensembles {s : (s, t) ← S inj (1 λ )} λ∈N and {s :
In fact, we also consider a relaxed definition of lossy TDFs in some situations, which we call almost-always lossy TDFs. In particular, we need that with overwhelming probability, the description s of a function describes an injective function while F −1 (s, ·) is the inversion of F (s, ·). Moreover, we also require that the lossy function F (s, ·) generated from S loss has image size at most 2 r = 2 n−k with overwhelming probability . 2) All-But-One Lossy Trapdoor Functions: The new notion of ABO-TDFs is a richer abstraction of LTDFs. Briefly, in an ABO collection, every function has another extra input which is called its branch. All the branches are injective TDFs, except for one branch that is lossy. 1) Sampling a trapdoor function with given lossy branch: for any b
, where s is a function index and t is its trapdoor.
2) Evaluation of injective functions: For any
n , and G −1
n whose image has size at most 2 r = 2 n−k . 4) Hidden lossy branch: The ensembles {s :
Remark 4: Just as lossy TDFs, we also consider a relaxed definition of ABO-TDFs and we call it almostalways ABO-LTDFs. In particular, we require that the injective, invertible and lossy properties hold with overwhelming probability.
3) Chameleon All-But-One Trapdoor Functions: Chameleon ABO-TDFs is also a specific kind of ABOTDFs with two variable (a, b) as a branch [9] . We recall it as follows. Let A×B = {A λ ×B λ } λ∈N be two families of sets whose elements is the branches. Then, Definition 5 (Chameleon ABO-TDFs [9] , [10] ): A family of (n, k)-chameleon ABO-LTDFs consists of four PPT algorithms (S ch , F ch , F −1 ch , CLB ch ) which have the following properties:
1) Sampling a function: For any λ ∈ N, S ch (1 λ ) outputs (s, t, Q) where s is a function index, t is its trapdoor and Q ⊂ A λ × B λ is a set of lossy branches.
n , and
3) Evaluation of lossy functions: For any
n whose image has size at most 2 n−k . 4) Chameleon property: On input the function index s, the trapdoor t and any a ∈ A λ , CLB ch computes a unique b ∈ B λ to result in a lossy branch (a, b). In formula, b ← CLB ch (s, t, a) such that (a, b) ∈ Q. 5) Security (1)-Indistinguishability between lossy branches and injective branches: It is hard to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch. Any PPT algorithm A that receives s as input, where (s, t, Q) ← S ch (1 λ ), has only a negligible probability of distinguishing a pair (a, b 0 ) ∈ Q from (a, b 1 ) / ∈ Q, even a is chosen by A. Formally, let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a distinguisher CH-LI and define its advantage as Adv
It is hard to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch, if Adv ∈ Q and CLB ch (s, t, a) output b satisfying (a, b) ∈ Q, both with overwhelming probability, then we call the collection almost-always chameleon ABO-TDFs. 4) Homomorphic Encryption: Definition 6 (Homomorphic Encryption [9] , [10] ): A PKE scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is called homomorphic if:
• It is CPA seucre;
• The plaintext space is a group M and we denote the group operation by "+"; • all the ciphertexts are members of a group C ; • ∀x 0 , x 1 ∈ X, and ∀r 0 , r 1 in R, there exists an r * ∈ R satisfying Enc pk (x 0 + x 1 , r * ) = Enc pk (x 0 , r 0 )Enc pk (x 1 , r 1 ).
III. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF CHAMELEON ABO-TDFS
be three polynomials of λ. Let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a homomorphic encryption scheme with plaintext space M and randomness space R satisfying |M | > d|R|. In addition, we assume that 1) M is a finite field (or commutative ring with multiplicative identity and, with overwhelming probability, each element in M has multiplicative inverse when we construct almost-always chameleon ABOTDFs). 2) For a, m ∈ M , (Enc pk (m)) a = Enc pk (am).
In the following, we give the description of our chameleon ABO-TDFs (S ch , F ch , F −1 ch , CLB ch ) with the set of branches
• Sampling a function: S ch takes as input 1 λ . It invokes Gen(1 λ ) to generate (pk, sk). Then it samples uniformly at random a matrix
. It outputs the function index s = (pk, C), the trapdoor t = (sk, D) and the set of lossy branches Q which is the set of all pairs of
, where x ∈ M . It computes
and outputs y.
• Inverting an injective function:
and outputs
• Computing a lossy branch: CLB ch takes as input (s, t, a 1 , · · · , a k ). It can obtain (b 1 , · · · , b l ) since rank(B d×l ) ≥ l, where B d×l is the matrix that was sampled to satisfying (1) . Then it output (b 1 , · · · , b l ). Now we state our main theorem as follows.
Theorem 7: The algorithms (S ch , F ch , F −1 ch , CLB ch ) is a collection of (log |M |, log |M | − log d|R|)-chameleon all-but-one trapdoor functions.
Proof: We prove this theorem from the following aspects:
is a deterministic injective function over the domain M since the randomness of the encryption algorithm has been determined by the relationships of x ij and c ij .
Then the image size of F ch is at most d|R|. Therefore the amount of lossiness is at least log|M | − logd|R|. 4) Hard to distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch: Since the scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is CPA-secure, the scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ), whose encryption algorithm is
and decryption algorithm is corresponding to it, is also CPA-secure. Now if A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is a PPT distinguisher who can distinguish a lossy branch from an injective branch with non-negligible probability. We can use A to construct a PPT adversary A who breaks the CPA-secure of Π . A works as follows:
A : on input pk; samples
and
receives the challenge ciphertext
, where Obviously, we have
This contradicts the CPA-security of Π . 5) Hard to find one-more lossy branch: We observe that the matrix (x ij ) d×(k+l+1) are hidden by the CPA-secure PKE. A could obtain the following equations:
However, there are |M | k+l kinds of pairs that satisfy those equations and each of them are equally likely. Formally, we prove that if there exists an PPT algorithm A that can find one-more lossy branch with non-negligible probability, then we can construct PPT inverter I which can breaks the onewayness of the PKE scheme. I works as follows:
I : on input y, pk; chooses x ij ∈ M and computes c ij = Enc pk (x ij )
; chooses randomly i 0 ∈ {1, · · · , d}, j 0 ∈ {1, · · · , k+l+1}\{k+1}; let C 1 be the matrix whose element c i0,j0 is replaced by y (without loss of generality we assume j 0 ≤ k);
Obviously, we have
This contradicts to the one-wayness of the PKE Π.
IV. TWO SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we give two special cases of our generic construction described above by fixing the corresponding parameters.
A. The First Case
Now we fix the parameters as d = k = l = 1. We remark that this is the case discussed in [9] , where the authors constructed a chameleon all-but-one TDFs and used them to improve efficiency of the CCA scheme presented in [1] .
B. The Second Case
In this subsection, we fix the parameters as d = l = 1, k = 0. As previously mentioned, let Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a homomorphic encryption scheme with plaintext space M and randomness space R satisfying |M | > |R|. In addition, we assume that 1) M is a finite field (or commutative ring with multiplicative identity and, with overwhelming probability, each element in M has multiplicative inverse when we construct almost-always ABO-TDFs) 2) For a, m ∈ M , (Enc pk (m)) a = Enc pk (am).
We remark that, in this situation, we essentially give a construction of ABO-TDFs with branches set M . In the following, we describe the construction in detail. A collection of ABO-TDFs (S abo , G abo , G −1 abo ) is defined as follows:
It invokes Gen(1 λ ) to generate (pk, sk). Then it samples randomly x 1 , x 2 ∈ M satisfying b * x 1 + x 2 = 0 and computes c 1 = Enc pk (x 1 ), c 2 = Enc pk (x 2 ). The function index is s = (pk, c 1 , c 2 ) and the trapdoor is t = (sk, x 1 , x 2 ).
• Evaluating a function G abo : takes as input (s, b, x),
x and outputs y.
• Inverting an injective function G Theorem 8: The algorithms described above give a collection of (log |M |, log |M | − log |R|) almost-always all-but-one trapdoor functions.
Proof:
x computes an deterministic function over the domain M since the randomness of Enc pk (·) has been determined by the relationship between x 1 , x 2 and c 1 , c 2 . Meanwhile, the function G abo (s, b, x) is always injective except that the event that x 1 = 0 whose probability is negligible.
2.
. Therefore, the image size of G abo (s, b * , ·) is at most |R|, and the amount of lossiness is at least (log |M |, log |M |−log |R|).
3. Hidden lossy branch: Since the scheme Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is CPA-secure, the scheme Π = (Gen , Enc , Dec ), whose encryption algorithm is Enc pk (x 1 , x 2 ) = (Enc pk (x 1 ), Enc pk (x 2 )) and decryption algorithm is corresponding to it, is also CPA-secure. Now if A = (A 1 , A 2 ) is a PPT distinguisher who can distinguish a lossy branch with non-negligible probability when given the function index s. We can use This contradicts the CPA-security of Π .
V. A SIMPLE IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we give a simple homomorphic encryption scheme which can be used to implement our constructions of almost-always chameleon ABO-TDFs and ABO-TDFs.
Formally, we consider the Damgård-Jurik (DJ) homomorphic encryption scheme [22] . Let GenModulus be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1 λ , outputs (N, P, Q) where N = P Q and P, Q are λ-bit primes (except with probability negligible). In addition, we require that gcd(N, φ(N )) = 1 (such N is called admissible). Now we describe the Damgård-Jurik scheme Π = (DJ.Gen, DJ.Enc, DJ.Dec):
• DJ.Gen(1 λ ): runs GenModulus(1 λ ) to obtain (N, P, Q). Then choose a natural number < P, Q. The public key is (N, ) and the private key is sk = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1).
• DJ.Enc : To encrypt a message m ∈ Z N with respect to the public key (N, ), choose randomly r ← Z * N and output the ciphertext c = (1 + N ) m · r N mod N +1 .
• DJ.Dec : To decrypt a ciphertext c using the private key sk = lcm(P −1, Q−1), we first compute, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem d, such that d = 1 mod N and d = 0 mod sk. Then compute c d = (1+N ) m mod N +1 . At last, we can compute (m mod N ) using the algorithm given in [22] . In addition, [22] also proved that based on decisional composite residuosity assumption, the encryption scheme described above is CPA-secure.
We remark that the DJ-scheme is sufficient for us to construct the primitives introduced in this paper. In order to illustrate the main idea, we only give the concrete method to construct the ABO-TDFs of Section IV-B. Formally, a collection of ABO-TDFs (S abo , G abo , G −1 abo ) based on DJ-scheme is defined as follows:
• S abo (1 λ , b * ): It invokes DJ.Gen(1 λ ) to generate the public/private key pair (pk, sk) =((N, ),(lcm(P − 1, Q − 1))). Then it samples randomly x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z N satisfying b * x 1 + x 2 = 0 and computes c 1 = DJ.Enc pk (x 1 ), c 2 = DJ.Enc pk (x 2 ).
The function index is s = (pk, c 1 , c 2 ) and the trapdoor is t = (sk, x 1 , x 2 ). Note that, with overwhelming probability, the item bx 1 + x 2 mod N has multiplicative inverse.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we generalize the construction of chameleon ABO-TDFs in [9] . As an application of our generalization, we construct an ABO-TDFs which can be used to construct CCA-secure public key encryption schemes by using homomorphic encryption scheme with some additional properties.
